Abstract
Introduction
With the increasing number of systems that provide services over open networks, remote authentication [5] is critical for preventing unauthorized parties from accessing remote system resources. Smart card based authentication schemes [1- 4, [6] [7] [8] are the most commonly used mechanism in remote user authentication schemes. System resources or services are often provided by many servers distributed over a network to make remote user access efficient and convenient. The authentication protocols for multi-server environment are required evidently. Most traditional authentication schemes use real IDs or static IDs for multi-server environments [6] . However, this allows malicious users to trace and identify user requests by monitoring the communication between servers. Therefore, employing a dynamic ID for each login can avoid the risk of ID-theft [1, 4, [6] [7] .
In 2009, Liao and Wang proposed a secure dynamic ID based remote user authentication scheme for multi-server environments [7] . Their scheme uses only hashing functions in mutual authentication and session key agreement and dynamic IDs instead real or static IDs to achieve user anonymity. They claimed that their scheme can get service granted from multi-server environments. Recently, Hsiang and Shih proposed an improved scheme [2] to fix the security flaws found in Liao-Wang's scheme. Hsiang and Shih, and they claimed that their scheme maintains the benefits and increases the security of Liao-Wang's scheme, while providing mutual authentication that Liao-Wang's scheme lacks. In this paper, however, it is shown that Hsiang-Shih's scheme cannot withstand user and server impersonation attacks. Their scheme is thus vulnerable to malicious users and insecure for practical applications.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, Hsiang-Shih's scheme is briefly reviewed. In section 3, we analyze the weaknesses of Hsiang-Shih's scheme. The conclusions are given in Section 4.
Hsiang-Shih's scheme is briefly reviewed in this section. For convenience, the notations used in Hsiang-Shih's scheme are listed below.
* RC registration center * x master secret key of RC * r, y secret numbers of RC
blind factor of U i * S j j-th remote server * SID j identification of S j * h(·) secure one-way hash * ⊕ bitwise XOR operation * || string concatenation operation Hsiang-Shih's scheme assumes that only RC knows the master secret key x and two secret numbers r, y. There are four phases in Hsiang-Shih's scheme: the registration phase, the login phase, the mutual authentication and session key agreement phase, and the password change phase.
Registration Phase
In the registration phase, user U i initially registers with registration center RC. U i submits his identity ID i and password pw i to registration center RC, then, U i and RC performs the following steps:
Step R1. U i chooses his password pw i and arbitrary number b i , and then, computes h(b i ⊕pw i ).
Step R2. U i sends {ID i , h(b i ⊕pw i )} to RC over a secure channel.
Step R3. Upon receiving the registration information, RC performs the following computations:
Step R5. Upon receiving the smart card, U i enters b i into his smart card.
Login Phase
This phase is invoked whenever U i requests to log into S j . U i inputs his identity ID i , password pw i , and the identity of target server SID j into his smart card, and the smart card performs the following steps:
Step L1.
and H i * = h(T i ), and then checks whether H i * and H i are identical. If they are not equal, the smart card rejects U i ; otherwise, the credentials of U i are assured.
Step L2. The smart card generates nonce N i and performs the following computations:
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Mutual Verification and Session Key Agreement Phase
In this phase, user U i and server S j authenticate each other. After the mutual authentication protocol has been completed, U i and S j compute their session key SK, respectively. U i and S j perform the following steps:
Step V1. Upon receiving the login request, S j generates nonce N rj and computes M jr = h(SID j || y) ⊕N rj , and then sends the message {M jr , SID j , D i , C 0 , N i } to registration center RC.
Step V2a. Upon receiving S j 's message, RC computes
Step V2b. RC computes C 0 ' = h(A i || N i + 1 || SID j ) and compares it with C 0 . If they are not equal, RC terminates the authentication protocol.
Step V2c. RC generates nonce N rj and computes
, and sends {C 1 , C 2 , N rj } back to S j .
Step V3. Upon receiving RC's reply, S j computes C 1 ' = h(N rj || h(SID j || y) || N rj ) and compares it with C 1 . If they are not equal, S j reports an RC authentication error and terminates the authentication protocol.
Step V4.
Step V5. 
Password Change Phase
In this phase, user U i can update his password without the help of registration center RC. U i and his smart card perform the following steps:
Step C1. U i inserts his smart card to his card reader, inputs {ID i , pw i }, and requests to change password.
Step C2. Upon receiving U i 's request, the smart card computes
and H i * = h(T i ) and checks whether H i * and H i are equal. If not, the smart card rejects U i ; otherwise, U i is asked to choose new password pw inew . Step C3. After U i inputs pw inew , U i 's smart card computes
Finally, V inew and B inew are stored back to the smart card to replace V i and B i respectively.
Weaknesses of Hsiang-Shih's Scheme
Hsiang and Shih claimed that their scheme is secure and provides mutual authentication. In this section, however, we show that Hsiang-Shih's scheme cannot withstand user and server impersonation attacks. Their scheme is thus vulnerable to malicious users and insecure for practical applications.
User Impersonation Attack
First, we show that a malicious user can easily impersonate another user without his password and smart card in Hsiang-Shih's scheme. Suppose that there is a malicious user with identity U a in HsiangShih's scheme. Since U a is authenticated by remote server S j , U a holds a smart card containing {V a , B a ,  b a , R a , H a , h(·) }, and those authentication information are known by U a . U a manipulates both of the authentication information stored on the smart card and the collected communication flows of target user U i to impersonate U i by the following steps:
Step U1. U a first obtains h(x⊕r) = R a ⊕A a by computing A a = B a ⊕h(b a ⊕pw a ) .
Step U2. Then, U a retrieves U i 's login request {CID i , P ij , Q i , D i , C 0 , N i } from the collected communication flows of user U i , and performs the following computations:
Step U3. U a pickups a nonce N a and performs the following computations:
Step U4. U a sends the forged login request {CID i *, P ij *, Q i *, D i *, C 0 *, N a } to S j .
Step U5. Upon receiving the login request, S j pickups a nonce N rj and computes M jr = h(SID j || y) ⊕N rj , and then sends the message {M jr , SID j , D i *, C 0 *, N a } to registration center RC.
Step U6a. Upon receiving S j 's message, RC computes N rj * = M jr ⊕h(SID j || y), R i * = D i *⊕SID j ⊕ N a , and A i * = R i * h(x⊕r).
Step U6b. RC computes C 0 * = h(A i * || N a + 1 || SID j ) and checks C 0 * = C 0 .
Step U6c. RC pickups a nonce N rj and computes C 1 * = h(N rj || h(SID j || y) || N rj ) and C 2 * = A i * h(h(SID j || y) || N rj ), and then sends {C 1 *, C 2 *, N rj } back to S j . Step U7. Upon receiving RC's reply, S j computes C 1 ' = h(N rj || h(SID j || y) || N rj ) and checks C 1 ' = C 1 *.
Step U8. 
Server Impersonation Attack
In this subsection, it is shown that a malicious user can easily impersonate a remote server without the secret information sharing between servers and the registration center in Hsiang-Shih's scheme. Suppose that there is a malicious user with identity U a in Hsiang-Shih's scheme. U a is trying to impersonate remote server S j to cheat user U i . U i sends his login request
Using h(x⊕r) = R a ⊕A a and the procedure discussed in the previous subsection (Section 3.1), U a can get: As shown above, U i is fooled into believing that malicious user U a is authenticated server S j , and U a is to play S j and to control U i 's request to S j . U a is able to impersonate S j without the help of RC, and therefore, Hsiang-Shih's scheme is vulnerable to server impersonation attacks.
Security Flaw
From the results in the above two subsection, it shows that in Hsiang-Shih's scheme, a legitimate user can easily compute h(x⊕r), so any legitimate user in their scheme is able to perform user/server impersonation attacks. Hsiang-Shih's scheme thus fails to provide mutual authentication.
Conclusions
In this paper, we demonstrate that Hsiang-Shih's scheme is vulnerable to user and server impersonation attacks. They claimed that their scheme maintains the benefits and increases the security of Liao-Wang's scheme, while providing mutual authentication that Liao-Wang's scheme lacks. However, our studies show that a malicious user in Hsiang-Shih's scheme can not only easily impersonate another user to access remote servers without the correct password, but also can masquerade any remote server to cheat another user without secret information issued from the registration center. Thus their scheme is insecure for practical applications. 
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